LeRoy
Goldman
The Shadow Knows
The Shadow Knows
Published: Sunday, June 30, 2013 at 4:30 a.m.
Affirmative action's neck is in a noose
Last Monday, the Supreme Court
decided this term's major affirmative action case, Fisher v. the
University of Texas. It was a much anticipated ruling that some had
expected and feared would reverse decades of affirmative action
policy.
When the court's ruling didn't go
that far, the collective, though inaccurate, sigh of relief from
liberals was audible from coast to coast. The Huffington Post's
headline was, "Supremes Punt on Affirmative Action."
Politico trumpeted, "SCOTUS Passes on Affirmative Action."
Harvard law professor Cass Sunstein's analysis was titled, "Judicial Minimalism Triumphs
in Affirmative Action Case."
God bless them one and all. They
got it wrong!
The case in question was a
challenge to the University of Texas' use of race with respect to
undergraduate admissions. Abigail Fisher, a white woman, applied for
admission but was rejected. She then sued, arguing that she had been
a victim of racial discrimination because minority students with
inferior credentials had won admission to the university. Her claim
asserts that the racial discrimination she alleges is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution.
Both the federal district court and
the 5th Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
university and against Ms. Fisher.
To put this decision in
perspective, we need to look back to 2003 when the Supreme Court
issued a landmark affirmative action ruling in the case of Grutter v.
Bollinger, a case involving the University of Michigan Law School.
Grutter was a 5-4 decision in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote
the majority opinion.
The court ruled that the use of
affirmative action is constitutional if it includes race among
multiple factors for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body.
It also ruled that it would be unconstitutional if the university's
admissions process advantaged one student over another based upon
race alone.
Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor found that the law school's admissions process was "narrowly
tailored" and therefore permissible because it did not rely
solely upon race or a racial quota system.
In Grutter, the high court
reaffirmed the necessity for using the strict scrutiny standard of
judicial review in cases involving race and the 14th Amendment.
Strict scrutiny is the most restrictive form of judicial review.
Strict scrutiny presumes the law or policy to be unconstitutional,
and thus the state must prove its constitutionality. If proven, the
state must then show that its approach is narrowly tailored to meet
the intended result.
In deciding the Texas case last
week, the Supreme Court not only reaffirmed the use of the strict
scrutiny standard, it used that standard to overturn the decisions of
lower courts that had ruled in favor of the University of Texas. In
so doing, the high court raised the bar significantly for the
University of Texas, and potentially many others.
Writing on SCOTUSblog.com at the
time of oral arguments before the Supreme Court last fall, Amy Howe
stated that "even if the core of Grutter survives, so that
universities can still consider race as one factor in their
admissions programs, the court is likely to put some real teeth into
the limits on when and how it can do so."
She turns out to be a prophet
because the court has now ruled that race can only be used to achieve
a diverse student body when there is no other realistic alternative.
Lyle Denniston, also writing on
SCOTUSblog.com, elaborates this same key part of the court's ruling.
He argues that the court's decision has partly walked away from the
part of Grutter that was willing to allow courts to defer to the
"good faith" of academic administrators that there is an
educational benefit in using race as one factor in admitting
students.
Instead, the Supreme Court has now
required the lower court to use a two-step method that will first
look at the university's good-faith basis for using race as a factor
in admissions. But then the university will have to demonstrate that
there is no nonracial alternative to achieving a diverse student
body. If there is a nonracial alternative that is workable, then race
can't be used.
And there's more. In an unusual
footnote in Grutter in 2003, Justice O'Connor wrote, "We expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary ... ." Three years later, in November 2006, the
voters of Michigan decided to advance her timetable. They voted 58
percent to 42 percent to approve a statewide ballot measure that
banned affirmative action in Michigan.
A group called the Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action sued, and the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that, with respect to higher education, the ban violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The case, known as
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, has now been
taken up by the Supreme Court and will be decided next year.
The Supreme Court's forthcoming
ruling in the Michigan case may be a blockbuster because, unlike the
Texas case, it "directly tests whether the Constitution's
guarantee of equality bars a state from adopting a flat ban on the
use of race in public policy," according to Denniston on
SCOTUSblog.
Recent polling shows that 76
percent of Americans oppose race-based college admissions. Don't be
surprised if next year the Supreme Court closes Justice O'Connor's
25-year window 14 years early.
The Shadow's oiling the trapdoor on
the gallows, but Goldman can be reached at: EmailMe
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